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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents preliminary findings of a content analy-
sis of tweets posted by false accounts operated by the Inter-
net Research Agency (IRA) in St Petersburg. We relied on a 
historical database of tweets to retrieve 4539 tweets posted 
by IRA-linked accounts in 2012-2017 and coded 2501 
tweets manually. The messages cover US newsworthy 
events, the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in 2015, and the 
Brexit referendum in 2016. Tweets were annotated using 19 
control variables to investigate whether IRA operations on 
social media are consistent with classic propaganda models. 
The results show that the IRA operates a composite of user 
accounts tailored to perform specific tasks, with the lion’s 
share of their work focusing on US daily news activity and 
the diffusion of polarized news across different national con-
texts. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Social media propaganda → IRA propaganda; Social 
network sites → Manipulation -> Disinformation 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we present preliminary findings of a research 
investigation into, what the social media company Twitter 
defines as, “a propaganda effort by a Russian government-
linked organization known as the Internet Research Agency” 
[19]. We analyze 2501 messages posted on Twitter between 
2012 and 2017 by accounts with false identities operated by 
the Internet Research Agency (IRA). According to Twitter, 
these accounts were part of “Russian efforts to influence the 
2016 [US] election through automation, coordinated activ-
ity, and advertising” [7]. Drawing on theoretical concepts 
from propaganda studies, we investigate dominant themes 
and discourses produced by the IRA through false accounts 
claiming to represent US citizens as well as news channels 
and organizations. 
The study relies on a list of 2752 deleted Twitter accounts 
that was handed over to the US Congress by Twitter on 31 
October 2017 as part of investigations into Russia’s med-
dling in the 2016 US elections [7]. In his testimony before 
Congress, Twitter’s acting General Counsel, Sean Edgett, 
stated that the company identified a total of 36,746 “Russian-
linked accounts”, which produced about 1.4 million tweets 
in connection to the US elections [7]. Twitter also identified 
2572 “Human-Coordinated Russian-Linked Accounts” op-
erated by the IRA [7]. As Twitter handed over the list of IRA 
accounts, their names became public. The company, how-
ever, has yet to share the corpus of deleted tweets posted by 
these accounts [11].  
This article examines 2501 tweets posted by IRA accounts 
found in connection to US daily news, Brazilian and Ukrain-
ian protests in 2013-2014, the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack 
in 2015, and the Brexit referendum in 2016. As data was col-
lected using event-specific hashtags and keywords, the re-
sulting dataset is not representative of the activity of the 
IRA. Yet, the tweets offers a unique glimpse into the work-
ings of IRA’s subversive propaganda strategies, which re-
main largely underexamined. 
There are important epistemological issues that need to be 
taken into consideration within this line of inquiry and the 
specifics of the data being analyzed [10]. This is particularly 
the case of information potentially designed to induce a state 
of psychological warfare [15]. In the following section, we 
briefly present an overview of scholarly contributions to so-
cial media propaganda, outline the theoretical framework 
underpinning this study, and present the research questions 
deriving from propaganda theory. 
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2 STATE PROPAGANDA IN DIGITAL MEDIA 
While propaganda predates mass communication technolo-
gies by several centuries, 20th century state propaganda was 
intimately connected to the rise of mass media such as news-
papers, radio, and television [12]. Mass media evolved along 
with increasingly complex propaganda techniques, ulti-
mately leading to a state of globalized warfare when propa-
ganda dissemination reached unprecedented scales [18]. 
Propaganda went through considerable changes [20], but the 
centrality of mass media remained a stable component in 
propaganda diffusion [8, 12]. 
The emergence of social network sites was greeted as a for-
midable challenger to the monopoly of mass media and cen-
tralized publishing systems. The decentralized nature of so-
cial networks would allow for dissenting voices to be ex-
pressed and heard [5, 6]. Social platforms were heralded, as 
exemplified by Boler and Nemorin, writing that “the prolif-
erating use of social media and communication technologies 
for purposes of dissent from official government and/or cor-
porate-interest propaganda offers genuine cause for hope” 
[5]. While mass media relies on one-to-many communica-
tion, which is difficult and at times impossible for activists 
to circumvent, social media enable citizens to organize and 
coordinate protests through distributed networks [6]. 
Despite early optimism around social media, recent research 
has shown that rather than empowering citizens and disem-
powering authoritarian states, social media is increasingly 
appropriated by state actors to enforce mass censorship and 
surveillance along with propaganda and disinformation cam-
paigns [13, 14]. Technological advances in software devel-
opment and machine learning enable automated detection of 
political dissidents, removal of political criticism, and mass 
dissemination of government propaganda through social me-
dia. These emerging forms of political manipulation and 
control constitute a difficult object of analysis due to scant 
and often non-existing data along with extant methodologi-
cal and epistemological challenges. 
While mass mediated propaganda requires extensive re-
sources, any individual with an internet-capable device can 
potentially disseminate propaganda through social media 
[9]. Social network sites are distinctly dynamic platforms, in 
which social actors of all types communicate and interact. 
The network structure of digital environments enables citi-
zens to produce counter-discourses to established norms, 
practices, and policies. The platforms’ decentralized struc-
ture, however, also enables large-scale actors, such as au-
thoritarian states, to disseminate disguised propaganda ap-
pearing to derive from within a target population. State prop-
aganda can be further disseminated by users unaware of the 
manipulation. For scholars and journalists, such propaganda 
poses considerable challenges due to the difficulty of estab-
lishing authorship. Social media companies have so far been 
hesitant to provide support for such investigations, while of-
fering extensive anonymity for content producers and han-
dling abusive content by simply removing it [10]. This has 
led to a scenario in which little research has been carried out 
on the topic. 
In the context of the 2016 British EU membership referen-
dum, research estimates that 13,493 Twitter accounts were 
so-called social bots: software-driven digital agents produc-
ing and distributing social media messages [1]. Researchers 
identify bot-like accounts based on distinct characteristics 
that set them apart from regular accounts, most prominently 
the number and ratio of tweet to retweets, which is higher for 
social bots [1]. Bessi and Ferrara [3] used similar bot-detec-
tion techniques to estimate that 400,000 bots operated during 
the 2016 US elections. Despite these findings, literature is 
yet to establish the origin of such social bots, as Bessi and 
Ferrara [3] summarizes:  
… it is impossible to determine who operates such bots. 
State- and non-state actors, local and foreign govern-
ments, political parties, private organizations, and even 
single individuals with adequate resources… could ob-
tain the operational capabilities and technical tools to de-
ploy armies of social bots and affect the directions of 
online political conversation.  
It is difficult to establish the identity of disguised social me-
dia accounts [9, 10] and their country of origin [7]. While 
social bots can be identified based on traces of computer au-
tomation, disguised human-driven accounts can be difficult 
to recognize, as they do not display features clearly associ-
ated with automation. Disguised human-driven accounts can 
neither easily be found nor traced back to an original source 
or controller. Furthermore, potential identification of ac-
counts require collaboration with social media companies, 
which are reluctant to provide such support [10]. Within the 
scope of this study, Twitter has released a list of 2752 deleted 
accounts identified as operated by the IRA. Although Twit-
ter has not shared the tweets posted by these accounts [11], 
it is possible to trace campaign and social media activity 
spearheaded by the IRA.  
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & OBJECTIVES 
Jowett and O’Donnell [12] define propaganda as the “delib-
erate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). One 
such agenda pursued extensively by state actors throughout 
the 20th century is psychological warfare [12, 15], which ac-
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cording to Linebarger [15] encompasses “the use of propa-
ganda against an enemy, together with such other opera-
tional measures of a military, economic, or political nature” 
(p. 40). Unlike propaganda targeted at a state’s own popula-
tion, psychological warfare is waged against foreign states. 
Despite its name, psychological warfare is not restricted to 
periods of armed warfare. Jowett and O’Donnell  [12] argue 
that it “commences long before hostilities break out or war 
is declared… and continues long after peace treaties have 
been signed”. 
The study of propaganda and psychological warfare depends 
on identifying the ideology, context and underlying identi-
ties of the propagandist, the latter being particularly chal-
lenging for disguised propaganda [12]. Analysts can none-
theless engage in source-identification by studying “the ap-
parent ideology, purpose, and context of the propaganda 
message. The analyst can then ask, Who or what has the most 
to gain from this?” [12]. In relation to tweets produced by 
the IRA, we do not know the extent to which the Russian 
government was involved, but in view of the mutual military 
build-up and trade sanctions between the US and Russia [4], 
it is conceivable that Russia would benefit from supporting 
a Russian-friendly presidential candidate in the US. Accord-
ing to Twitter, the IRA accounts were part of “Russian ef-
forts to influence the 2016 election” [7], a characterization 
that implies a close connection to psychological warfare on 
social media. 
A key goal of psychological warfare throughout modern his-
tory has been to create confusion, disorder, and distrust be-
hind enemy lines [12, 18]. Through the use of grey or black 
propaganda, conflicting nation states have disseminated ru-
mors and conspiracy theories within enemy territories for 
“morale-sapping, confusing and disorganising purposes” 
[2]. Within propaganda theory, grey propaganda refers to 
that which has an unidentifiable or difficult to identify 
source, while black propaganda refers to that which claims 
to derive from within the enemy population [2, 12]. In this 
article, we use the term disguised propaganda to encompass 
both forms. According to Becker [2], black propaganda is 
particularly effective as means of psychological warfare 
“when there is widespread distrust of ordinary news sources” 
[2]. Considering the contemporary political landscape, in 
which only 33% of Americans, 50% of Brits, and 52% of 
Germans trust news sources “most of the time” [17], we hy-
pothesize that IRA-linked Twitter accounts deploy disguised 
propaganda (i.e., grey and black) to spread falsehoods and 
conspiracy theories. In view of that, we posit the following 
research questions: 
RQ1 Does the IRA propaganda effort on social media rely 
on grey and black propaganda? 
RQ2 Is IRA propaganda on social media centered around 
spreading rumors and conspiracy theories? 
 
The seminal work of Ellul [8] has detailed psychological 
warfare along a range of characteristics. Subversive psycho-
logical warfare most often comes in the form of propaganda 
of agitation [8], which refers to propaganda disseminated to 
stir up tension through use of “the most simple and violent 
sentiments… Hate is generally its most profitable resource” 
[8]. According to Ellul [8], propaganda of agitation not only 
seeks to prompt emotional responses, but also to direct be-
havior: “it operates inside a crisis or actually provokes the 
crisis itself” [8]. Drawing on these propositions, our third 
and fourth research questions are: 
RQ3 Is IRA propaganda on social media focused on dissem-
inating emotional and antagonistic content? 
RQ4 Do IRA propaganda efforts encourage antagonistic ac-
tion online and offline? 
 
4 DATA & METHODS 
The disguised IRA propaganda in our study has been sam-
pled by trawling through millions of historical tweets and 
searching for messages authored by IRA accounts, as iden-
tified by Twitter [7]. One account turned out to be a false-
positive, which has been excluded from our study [16]. The 
dataset spans six years and includes tweets with a topical fo-
cus on US news outlets, the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in 
2015 (e.g. #CharlieHebdo, #JeSuisCharlie), and the Brexit 
debate in 2016 (e.g. #Brexit, #GoodbyeBritain). Upon que-
rying the database, we found 4539 tweets posted by IRA ac-
counts between 2012 and 2017. The available data cannot 
account for the totality of messages posted by these accounts 
nor a representative sample. Accordingly, our study cannot 
estimate the extent of IRA propaganda on social media nor 
the prevalence of other forms of propaganda tactics. The 
findings presented in the following section are conditional 
on these constraints. 
Out of the 4539 tweets identified as posted by IRA accounts, 
a total of 1848 messages could not be annotated because they 
did not include text, were posted using the Cyrillic alphabet, 
or a combination of the above. The database is encoded in 
Latin-1 Supplement of the Unicode block standard, which 
does support Cyrillic characters, hence messages in Russian 
or Ukrainian were removed from the sample. The database 
archives only text and therefore we do not have access to 
images or videos embedded to tweets, except in cases of con-
tent that is still available. The remaining 2501 tweets were 
manually annotated along 19 variables established to explore 
the four research questions underpinning the study. Eighteen 
of these variables are deductive and one variable was found 
inductively based on an initial coding of a subsample of 10% 
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of tweets. One of the authors with previous experience cod-
ing social media propaganda coded the totality of messages. 
The variables listed below are not mutually-exclusive nor do 
they apply to all tweets in the dataset. 
1. National identity (based on of five attributes, including 
self-descriptions, language and Twitter names/handles - 
e.g. LAOnlineDaily). 
2. National context of tweets 
3. Language 
4. Retweeted Twitter account 
5. Mentioned or replied Twitter account 
6. Mentioned person or organization (non-Twitter mentions) 
7. Political party of mentioned, retweeted or replied person 
or account 
8. Endorsement of individual, organization or cause 
9. Disapproval of individual, organization or cause 
10. Religion  
11. Fatalities (five attributes: ‘risk of fatality’, ‘fatality’, ‘fa-
talities’, ‘5+ fatalities’ and ‘mass murder’) 
12. Issues (up to four attributes for each tweet based on sev-
enteen attributes established through an inductive cod-
ing of a sub-set of 10% of tweets) 
13. Encouragement of action (explicit encouragement, e.g. 
‘Vote for X’ or ‘Share this!’) 
14. Rumor/Conspiracy (two attributes: ‘yes’ and ‘high’, de-
fined as the dissemination of claims with no referenced 
sources) 
15. Aggressiveness (two attributes: ‘yes’ and ‘high’, de-
fined as use of curse words, threats and/or capitalized 
sentences). 
16. Antagonism (two attributes: ‘yes’ and ‘high’). 
17. Emotional (two attributes: ‘yes’ and ‘high’). 
18. Populism (eight attributes: ‘Reference to the people’, 
‘anti-establishment’, ‘anti-mainstream media’, ‘scape-
goating’, ‘call for action’, ‘ethno-cultural antagonism’, 
‘state of crisis/threat against society’, ‘the need for a 
strong leader’) 
19. Populism spectrum (two attributes: ‘Low’ and ‘High’) 
5 FINDINGS 
After manually annotating the tweets (N=2501), we found 
that most of them were written in English (n=2082), 324 in 
German, and 84 in Italian. The remaining tweets were writ-
ten in French (8), Dutch (1), Swedish (1), and Filipino (1). 
Most of the tweets (n=1607) address or are situated in a US 
national context, 923 refer to a British context, and 272 to 
Germany, with the coding scheme allowing several contexts 
to apply to the same tweet. The most prevalent topics are 
local affairs (n=1453), encompassing news pieces related to 
specific cities or municipalities, followed by politics 
(n=1184), crime (n=788), economy (n=272), and entertain-
ment (n=257). Only 5.72% of tweets cover rumors or con-
spiracy theories (n=148), but 11.76% include antagonisms 
(n=294), 10% comprise emotional statements, and 3.12% 
encourage online or offline antagonistic behavior (n=78).  
These issues are segmented across different types of ac-
counts, displaying distinct characteristics. This suggests that 
IRA propaganda efforts incorporate independent lines of ac-
tion that can be assigned to a typology of user accounts. To 
this end, we did a preliminary classification of accounts in 
the sample according to prevailing features, resulting in nine 
primary groups: 
Individuals 
1. Conservative patriots (Trump/Brexit supporters; US) 
2. “Ordinary” accounts (Personal experiences and some-
times conspiracy theories; US) 
3. Political news disseminators (US & Italy) 
4. Anti-EU Brexit supporters (Germany) 
5. Pro-EU Brexit supporters (Germany) 
News and Organizations 
6. Local news (US) 
7. War news (German, US, and unidentifiable) 
8. Political commentary (US) 
9. Conservative organizations (US) 
The preliminary classification highlights that the IRA uses 
different types of accounts to support various political agen-
das. Many of the accounts impersonate local news outlets in 
the US. This includes DailyLosAngeles, ChicagoDailyNew, 
DailySanFran and KansasDailyNews (type 6). Upon prob-
ing into the data, we found that they operate by relaying in-
formation sourced from established news outlets in the area 
they operate. The tweeting pattern comprises a single head-
line and not always include a link to the original source. 
When available, we resolved the shortened URLs embedded 
to tweets to identify the news source tweeted by disguised 
local news accounts. LAOnlineDaily tweeted exclusively 
Los Angeles Times content and ChicagoDailyNew follows a 
similar pattern having tweeted content from Chicago Trib-
une. As such, this cohort of news repeaters seems dedicate 
to replicating local news content with a potential bias to-
wards news items in the crime section and issues surround-
ing public safety. The local news stories distributed by IRA 
accounts are dominated by negative and contentious narra-
tives and/or amplify concerns about public security, particu-
larly crime incidents, but also fatal accidents and natural dis-
asters. The most prolific account in our dataset is user 
2624554209 with a total of 1212 tweets. This account oper-
ated under the handle DailyLosAngeles in 2016, but it was 
also active in 2015 under the username LAOnlineDaily. Be-
low is an example of the type of content relayed by 
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LAOnlineDaily. 
#breaking #LA Two fetuses found beside road in Fallbrook 
http://t.co/IIYpmtXaGCaking (LA Online Daily, Twitter, 3 
January 2015) 
 
The dataset also contains accounts impersonating American, 
British, German, and Italian individuals. These accounts of-
ten distribute content from established news sources (type 
3), but also post content written in a personal, emotional, and 
antagonistic style (type 1, 4, and 5). These users also offer 
clear support for political actors and agendas such as Brit-
ain’s withdrawal from the EU, US President Donald Trump, 
or the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The following 
tweets exemplify such content:   
Europe is killing itself. How long until there will be Belgium 
and French Sultanates? #StopIslam #Brexit #MAGA 
#MEGA  (Williams_Diana, Twitter, 18 June 2016) 
 
After #Brexit #Merkel will make Frankfurt stronger! 
#Merkelmussbleiben (LarsWolflars, Twitter, 21 July 2016,  
own translation from German) 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper offers preliminary insights into the strategies em-
ployed by the IRA on social media. We manually annotated 
messages to identify the extent to which IRA’s modus op-
erandi is consistent with classic propaganda models. We 
found numerous and conflicting types of disguised accounts 
suggesting that the IRA employs different propagandistic 
techniques depending on the country and targeted political 
agenda. Contrary to our expectations, we found that most ac-
tivity in the dataset was associated with accounts mimicking 
local news outlets. This group of accounts display a prefer-
ence for news stories dominated by contentious narratives 
that amplifies concerns about public security. 
The extent to which the Russian governments was involved 
in the IRA activity remains unknown and, thus, we lack a 
clear understanding of the strategic role played by the IRA. 
We nonetheless expect the investigation into Russia’s med-
dling in the 2016 elections to shed new light on these issues. 
Lastly, the results reported in this study are preliminary and 
contingent on the limitations of our data. Further research 
should explore the profiles of IRA-linked accounts to reveal 
the extent to which a classic distinction between covert and 
overt propaganda remains valid in the age of social media. 
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